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Executive Summary
A college degree often translates into 
economic success: Americans who start 
at the bottom of the income ladder 
quadruple their chances of making it to 
the top when they earn a four-year degree, 
according to past research by the Pew 
Economic Mobility Project. Nevertheless, 
many young people from the bottom  
and middle of the ladder never enroll in 
some form of postsecondary education, or 
do not graduate if they do.  The question 
is, why? 
There are two primary explanations at 
the individual level: college costs and 
academic preparation. These two drivers 
are not mutually exclusive.  Families who 
have less money to send their children to 
college also have fewer resources to invest 
in pre-college education. Many external 
factors outside of a family’s control also 
influence postsecondary decisions. For 
example, students consider the availability 
of jobs and financial aid when deciding 
whether to pursue higher education.   
In a time of increased financial 
hardship, however, it is important to 
better understand how family wealth, 
independent of other factors, affects 
students’ decisions about higher 
education. The purpose of this study, 
Housing Wealth and Higher Education: 
Building a Foundation for Economic 
Mobility, was to develop an economic 
model that isolates the impact that family 
wealth has on college choices.  
The recent housing boom and bust 
provided a unique opportunity to conduct 
this research. When housing prices were 
on a seemingly endless upward climb, 
many families experienced historically 
large wealth gains. When housing prices 
crashed, the wealth of many households 
evaporated.  Because housing has been the 
primary source of wealth for most low- 
and middle-income families, changes in 
home equity have a significant influence 
on total family assets.  
Since the boom occurred in different 
locations at different times, the author was 
able to develop a model that used variation 
in home equity as a natural experiment.1  
The model investigates whether changes 
in family wealth, as represented by gains 
in home equity, affected college decisions.  
The approach controls for a range of 
time-related, geographic, and individual 
tHe PeW cHaritaBle trusts2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
and family background factors that might 
also contribute to postsecondary choices 
so that the relationship between housing 
wealth and college enrollment, selection, 
and completion rates alone can be 
estimated.2   
Housing Wealth and Higher Education: 
Building a Foundation for Economic 
Mobility demonstrates that higher 
education decisions are highly sensitive 
to fluctuations in family resources. The 
model shows that low- and middle-income 
students whose families experienced 
increases in housing wealth just before 
reaching college age were more likely 
to attend college, more likely to attend 
higher-quality universities, and more likely 
to graduate.   
The report’s key findings include:
Students from low- and middle-income 
families were much more likely to 
enroll in college when their families 
experienced gains in housing wealth. 
■ For every $10,000 of home equity 
gains, the likelihood of enrolling in 
college increased by 6 percentage 
points among families with incomes 
below $70,000.
■ The wealth generated by rising home 
values is estimated to have increased 
college enrollment by 24 percent 
among low- and middle-income 
families during the housing boom. 
Without gains in home equity, just 
37 percent of these families’ children 
would have enrolled, rather than  
46 percent. 
■ There is little evidence that wealth 
gains affected college enrollment 
among families with incomes of 
$70,000 or more, or that they 
affected families of any income in 
earlier decades when housing equity 
was less liquid.
Students from low- and middle-
income families were more likely to 
select higher-quality schools, and 
were more likely to graduate with a 
four-year degree, when their families 
experienced gains in housing wealth.
■ Among students coming from 
families earning less than $70,000 
a year, the housing boom increased 
enrollment in four-year public 
flagship schools by 24 percent and 
reduced enrollment in community 
colleges by 17 percent.3 
■ Increased housing wealth raised the 
likelihood of college graduation by  
9 percent, compared to what it would 
have been without the housing 
boom, among low- and middle-
income students, lifting it to  
32 percent. 
This analysis suggests that the recent 
housing bust and resulting decrease 
in wealth could negatively impact the 
postsecondary decisions of low- and 
middle-income families.
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■ Home equity is estimated to have 
declined by 54 percent between 
2006 and 2010 for homeowners 
with income less than $70,000  
per year. 
■ Absent other changes in the 
economy that affect college 
decisions, the report suggests that 
the decrease in housing wealth 
alone would have reduced college 
enrollment for students from these 
families by 30 percent. It also would 
have decreased enrollment in four-
year public flagship schools by  
26 percent and increased community 
college attendance by 29 percent 
among college-goers from these 
families.4 
■ Similarly, absent other changes in 
the economy, the housing bust alone 
would have reduced four-year college 
graduation rates by 12 percent for 
students from families making less 
than $70,000 a year.
growing evidence that students at colleges 
with lower resources are less likely to 
graduate and take more time to graduate if 
they do complete a degree.7 
One of the more compelling explanations 
for these gaps is that the high and growing 
cost of college prohibits lower-resource 
families from investing in postsecondary 
education for their children: Between 
1981 and 2009, the cost of tuition 
increased by 125 percent at public 
four-year schools, by 138 percent at 
private four-year universities, and by 
151 percent at community colleges.8 
However, because family resources are 
correlated with the academic preparation 
of students, determining the causal role 
family resources play in higher-education 
decisions is difficult. Low-income families 
also have fewer resources for pre-college 
education, which reduces their children’s 
opportunities for postsecondary access and 
success.   
Isolating the impact of college affordability 
on postsecondary education—
independent of academic preparation—
has important implications for policy 
Education in general, and higher 
education in particular, is one of the major 
determinants of economic mobility in the 
United States. Past Economic Mobility 
Project (EMP) research has shown that 
Americans who start at the bottom of 
the income ladder are four times as 
likely to make it to the top when they 
earn a four-year degree.5 Over the past 
several decades, the importance of higher 
education for economic mobility has only 
increased as the United States economy 
has become more skill-intensive.6 
Despite the large and growing benefits of 
investing in higher education, increases in 
college enrollment and graduation have 
been sluggish. This has been particularly 
pronounced for students from low-income 
households, and educational attainment 
gaps across the income distribution have 
grown over time. The children of low-
income families are much less likely to 
go to college than those from wealthier 
families, and attendees from low-income 
families are more likely to enroll in 
less-selective four-year schools and in 
community colleges, where per-student 
resources are significantly lower. There is 
Introduction
tHe PeW cHaritaBle trusts4
5Housing WealtH and HigHer education: Building a Foundation For economic moBility
INTRODUCTION
makers striving to increase college 
enrollment and graduation rates across 
the income distribution. To this end, this 
report uses variation in family resources 
generated by the recent housing boom 
as a natural experiment to investigate the 
role that family wealth plays in higher 
education decisions. 
Housing wealth is an ideal asset on which 
to focus in assessing the basic question 
of how important family financial 
resources are for postsecondary education 
for two reasons. First, particularly for 
low- and middle-income families, their 
home is their primary source of wealth.  
For example, in 2004, 48 percent of 
homeowners had less than $10,000 in 
non-housing, non-IRA savings, and among 
homeowners with less than $70,000 
in family income, median savings was 
$6,000. However, median home equity 
among these households was $80,000.9 
Second, the past decade was characterized 
by unprecedented volatility in housing 
prices. Between 2000 and 2006, home 
prices increased by 55 percent nationally, 
whereas between 2006 and 2010, 
home prices declined by 35 percent.10 
Housing wealth also became more liquid 
during the boom due to changes in the 
mortgage industry that made it easier to 
extract equity from homes, for instance 
through home equity lines of credit. This 
caused variation in home prices to affect 
significantly the liquid wealth of many 
households. Variation in home prices 
generated by the housing boom can thus 
be used to generate variation in family 
resources unrelated to students’ college 
preparation or other confounding factors.
This report finds that students whose 
families experienced increases in housing 
wealth just before reaching college age 
were more likely to attend college, were 
more likely to attend higher-quality 
universities and, for students from low- 
and middle-income families, were more 
likely to graduate. In general, the effects 
of additional wealth were concentrated 
among low- and middle-income students.  
Certainly, the specific circumstances of the 
nation’s recent housing boom are unlikely 
to recur, and the focus of this report is not 
the relative merits of homeownership as a 
wealth-building strategy. Rather, the results 
yield insight into the broader question of 
how financial constraints among families 
with college-age children affect the 
postsecondary decisions of these students, 
and what role wealth plays in alleviating 
these constraints. The report’s findings 
suggest the importance of supporting 
broad asset building among low- and 
middle-income families, providing 
low- and middle-income students with 
better access to financial supports to 
help pay for college and focusing on 
increasing college completion rates.
tHe PeW cHaritaBle trusts6
education, the college 
Wage Premium and 
economic mobility
Although it is no surprise that those 
with a college education earn more than 
those with only a high school diploma, 
this disparity has risen dramatically since 
the late 1970s. Figure 1 shows the ratio 
of hourly wages of those with a college 
degree to those with only a high school 
diploma, yearly from 1979 to 2008.11 The 
college wage premium almost doubled 
over this period (from 40 percent higher 
wages than a high school graduate to 
nearly 80 percent), and the benefits of a 
college degree have continued to rise since 
the 1970s. As the demand for skilled labor 
continues to increase in the United States, 
there is reason to believe this trend will 
continue for the foreseeable future.
The rising college wage premium drives 
the importance of education for economic 
mobility. Earning a four-year degree 
quadruples the chances that a child who 
starts at the bottom of the income ladder 
will rise all the way to the top (increasing 
the likelihood from 5 to 19 percent).12  
Without a college degree, nearly half (45 
percent) of children starting at the bottom 
remain there as adults (versus 16 percent 
of those who get a college degree).13 
Yet despite the large and growing 
wage benefits from investing in higher 
Income-Based Disparities  
in College-Going
Hourly Wage Ratio of Workers With 
a Bachelor’s Degree to Those with a 
High School Diploma
Four-year college graduates earn nearly twice as 
much per hour as those without education beyond 
high school.
Figure 1
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University of Michigan, the University of 
Virginia and the University of Colorado 
at Boulder. These universities have more 
resources than other public colleges in 
each state, attract more academically 
advanced students and have much more 
favorable academic outcomes among their 
student bodies.15 
Among families earning less than $25,000 
per year, 44 percent of their college-age 
children enroll in college. Among them, 
education, college enrollment has not 
increased at a similar pace. Since 1979, the 
college enrollment rate among high school 
graduates increased by just 35 percent, 
even though the college wage premium 
almost doubled.14 Since 1990, enrollment 
increased by only 8 percent, at a time 
in which the wages of college graduates 
were still growing relative to those of high 
school graduates, as shown in Figure 1. 
The fact that college completion has not 
kept pace with the growing disparity 
in earnings between high school and 
college graduates highlights the need to 
understand who is going to college and the 
barriers low-income students in particular 
might face in obtaining a degree.
educational attainment by 
income
The low response of college enrollment 
rates to the college wage premium is 
most pronounced among lower-income 
families. This point is underscored by 
the large differences across the income 
distribution in college investment, 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
For the purpose of this study, colleges 
are categorized into four distinct groups: 
flagship public four-year, non-flagship 
public four-year, private four-year and 
two-year. Flagship public universities 
are each state’s elite public institution 
(or multiple institutions as in the case 
of California, Texas and New York).  
Examples of flagship universities are the 
INCOME-BASED DISpARITIES IN COllEGE-GOING
College Enrollment by Family Income
Figure 2
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percent due to rounding.
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The correspondingly large differences 
across the income distribution in college 
completion reinforce this conclusion. 
Among college attendees from families 
with incomes less than $70,000 per year, 
28 percent obtain a four-year degree.  
For students from families with yearly 
income more than $125,000 per year, 60 
percent earn such a degree. Thus, lower-
income students invest in lower-quality 
colleges and universities, on average, and 
experience lower graduation rates. This 
report explores whether these differences 
in student choices and outcomes by 
income are causally related.
Possible reasons for the 
income gap in college- 
going and completion
The core theoretical explanations for lower 
college investment among low-income 
households take two forms. The first 
is that these families lack the resources 
necessary to finance a college education, 
particularly in light of the high and rising 
cost of college enrollment. Figure 3 shows 
tuition, fees, and room and board charges 
by institution type from 1981 through 
2009. For both four-year sectors, college 
attendance costs have risen by over 125 
percent. While the increases in costs are 
relatively constant in the private sector, in 
the public sector the cost increases have 
been steeper since 2001. Even among two-
year schools, costs have increased by more 
59 percent attend a community college 
and only 4 percent attend a flagship 
public four-year school and 12 percent 
attend a private four-year university. 
However, for households with incomes 
of more than $125,000 per year, the 
college enrollment rate is 87 percent. 
Among attendees, 23 percent choose a 
community college, whereas 19 percent 
attend a flagship public four-year 
university and 25 percent attend a private 
four-year college. 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the likelihood 
of enrolling in a two-year school drops 
precipitously with higher family income, 
whereas enrollment in elite public schools 
and in private universities increases 
substantially with income. While 38 
percent of children from the highest 
income group enroll in a private or 
flagship public college, 7 percent of those  
from the lowest income group do. The 
fact that students from higher-income 
households invest more in postsecondary 
education and are more likely to attend 
higher-resource universities, where 
graduation rates are better and students 
tend to earn more post-graduation, is 
likely to reduce economic mobility across 
generations. In other words, higher-
income students who enroll in college are 
more likely to remain higher income, and 
low-income students who do not invest in 
postsecondary education are more likely to 
remain low-income.  
Housing WealtH and HigHer education: Building a Foundation For economic moBility 9
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than 150 percent over this time period, 
although the overall expense is much 
lower than in four-year universities. While 
few students actually pay the full listed 
tuition because of financial aid, most of 
which comes from the federal government 
through tools like Pell Grants, the 
generosity of federal aid has been falling 
relative to tuition costs over this period.  
The complexity and underutilization of 
the financial aid system exacerbate the 
problem.16 
The second explanation for the gap in 
postsecondary enrollment between income 
groups is that students from lower-
income households are less academically 
prepared for college than are their peers 
Trends in Real Tuition, Fees, Room and Board by College Type
Figure 3
SOURCE: College Board (2010).
NOTE: Amounts are in 2010 dollars.
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from wealthier backgrounds.17 Such 
differences can develop because students 
whose families have fewer resources when 
they are of college age likely had fewer 
resources throughout their lives with 
which to invest in education. Whatever 
the reason for disparities in educational 
investment throughout childhood, this 
view argues such disparities are reflected 
in the level of college preparedness in early 
adulthood.18  
The underlying explanations for income 
differences in college enrollment are not 
mutually exclusive: Students from lower-
income families might be less academically 
qualified for college upon finishing high 
school and could face barriers to financing 
tHe PeW cHaritaBle trusts10
INCOME-BASED DISpARITIES IN COllEGE-GOING
family resources and college attendance 
decisions. This lack of a resolution 
is primarily because it is difficult to 
disentangle the competing explanations 
for the strong correlation between family 
income and postsecondary investment.  
Furthermore, nearly all past analyses have 
focused exclusively on family income.  
But if other household resources, such as 
housing wealth, affect the college-going 
decision, the extent of financial constraints 
could be mischaracterized.
their preferred choice of higher education.  
Identifying how important each factor 
is individually to the college investment 
decision is crucial to developing public 
policies to address the postsecondary 
education gap by income.  
While much research has been done 
on the role family financial constraints 
play in college enrollment differences 
by income, previous work has not fully 
resolved the causal connection between 
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The rise in college costs over the past 
decade coincided with historically high  
volatility in the housing market. Figure 
4 shows average real home prices in the 
United States since 1970. Before the 
late 1990s, there was little variation in 
aggregate home prices. However, from 
1998 to 2006, home prices increased by 
173 percent, and then from 2006 through 
2010 declined by 35 percent. These large 
changes were unprecedented in recent 
history, and they significantly affected 
household finances. Such effects likely 
were much larger for relatively low-income 
homeowners, who tend to have few assets 
aside from their home. For them, variation 
in home prices causes large fluctuations in 
total wealth.
In addition to growth in home prices, 
the housing boom was characterized by 
an increased liquidity of home equity.  
Around the turn of the century, changes 
in the mortgage industry made it much 
simpler and cheaper for households to 
extract the equity from their homes using 
financial instruments such as cash-out 
refinances, home equity loans and home 
equity lines of credit. Therefore, at the 
same time homeowners’ assets expanded 
in value, they also became much easier 
to use to finance consumption and 
investment. 
Figure 5 shows extracted home equity in 
each year as a percent of total personal 
income. As the figure demonstrates, in 
1990, home equity extraction was 2 
percent of income, while in 2004, it was 
9 percent, an increase of more than 320 
percent. The increase was concentrated 
Trends in Housing Wealth
Historical Real Home Price Trend
Figure 4
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from the late 1990s to the early 2000s.  
Equity extraction then declined between 
2004 and 2006 by 37 percent as the 
housing market began to drop. This 
decline has deepened in recent years as 
obtaining a home equity loan has become 
increasingly difficult.19
Home Equity Extraction as a 
Percentage of Personal Income
Figure 5
SOURCE: Greenspan and Kennedy (2007).
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Estimating the causal effect of housing 
wealth on college enrollment is 
complicated by the fact that families 
with such assets have children who 
are more likely to go to college due to 
unobserved attributes, such as preferences 
for education or student academic 
achievement. These analyses seek to isolate 
the effect of housing wealth on college 
attendance that is independent of these 
other potentially confounding factors. 
To do so, the analyses use the change in 
families’ housing wealth over the four 
years before college decision-making 
(roughly, the years the youth is in high 
school) to predict housing wealth at the 
time the choices are made. Then the 
impact of predicted housing wealth on 
college-going is assessed.22 This approach 
accounts for a range of time-related, 
geographic, and individual and family 
background factors that might also 
contribute to the college-going decision 
so that the relationship between housing 
wealth and college enrollment alone can 
be measured.23   
The methodology uses the fact that the 
timing and strength of the housing boom 
The dramatic changes in the housing 
market caused significant increases 
in liquid wealth, especially for lower-
income families that owned a home. 
By comparing the college attendance 
decisions of students from otherwise 
identical households, but who happened 
to come of college age in cities and time 
periods that led to more or less housing 
wealth, this report identifies how family 
resources impact postsecondary education 
decisions.20
data and methods
The data used to analyze college 
enrollment come from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), which began 
following a nationally representative set of 
families in 1968. Members of the original 
sample and their descendants have been 
interviewed continually since that time.  
Key to this study is that the PSID contains 
detailed questions regarding household 
finances, home ownership and home 
prices that indicate how each family’s 
housing wealth changes over time. The 
analyses are confined to young adults who 
were 18 or 19 years old between 2001 and 
2005.21 
How Important is Family Wealth 
for College Enrollment? 
tHe PeW cHaritaBle trusts14
HOW IMpORTANT IS FAMIlY WEAlTH FOR COllEGE ENROllMENT?
For more explanation of the research 
strategy, including potential challenges 
and how they were addressed, see the 
appendix.
results
For every $35,000 of home equity, the 
college enrollment rate increased by 5 
percent.
Figure 6 presents the results of simulating 
college enrollment rates for otherwise 
identical households with different 
levels of home equity. For students from 
homeowner families with no equity 
in 2005, the college attendance rate 
would have been 49.3 percent. The 25th 
percentile of the equity distribution among 
homeowners—that is, the equity of the 
family that had less equity than 75 percent 
of families—was $35,000 in 2005.26  
Increasing home equity by $35,000 
increased the college enrollment rate to 
51.8 percent. At the median home equity 
level of $75,000, 54.6 percent of potential 
students attended college, and at the 75th 
percentile of home equity ($150,000), the 
college enrollment rate was 60 percent. 
Thus, for every $35,000 of home equity, 
the college enrollment rate increased by 5 
percent from the no-home-equity baseline. 
Increasing a family’s equity from the 25th 
to the 75th percentile of the home equity 
distribution boosted college enrollment by 
more than 8 percentage points, or by 16 
percent. 
differed across cities over time, and it 
compares the college-going behavior of 
otherwise identical individuals whose 
families have different housing wealth 
because they came of college age at 
different times with respect to their 
cities’ housing boom. The analyses are 
restricted to families that did not move 
across cities, meaning that the results 
cannot be driven by those who moved to 
take advantage of home-price growth in 
order to be able to better afford a college 
education for their children.  In that case, 
unobserved attributes of families might be 
behind the housing wealth/college-going 
relationship.24
Complicating this research strategy is  
the fact that if families liquidate their 
housing wealth to finance a college 
education, those with students who enroll 
in college will have less housing equity 
than otherwise identical households with 
children who do not enroll. Thus, it will 
appear as if youth from lower-wealth 
families are more likely to attend college, 
because those households that tap their 
home equity to pay for college have lower 
home equity growth than those whose 
children do not go to college. To account 
for this complication, instead of using 
actual change in housing wealth to predict 
housing wealth at the time of college-
going, the estimated change in wealth with 
no home equity extracted over the prior four 
years is used. 25  
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These findings represent large changes in 
college enrollment due to family wealth, 
and they point to a significant effect of 
the housing boom on college enrollment.  
Between 2001 and 2005, average home 
equity increased by $57,965, which 
implies that rising housing wealth 
increased college enrollment by 4.1 
percentage points, or by 8 percent, 
compared with what it would have been 
without the housing boom.27  
The effect of family wealth on college 
enrollment for the whole sample 
potentially masks large differences across 
the income distribution. If low- and 
middle-income households are more likely 
to be financially constrained in paying for 
a postsecondary education, their decisions 
should be more sensitive to housing 
wealth fluctuations than those of upper-
income households. 
Figure 7 shows predicted college 
enrollment rates by home equity levels 
separately by family income group. The 
groups analyzed are families with less 
than $70,000 in yearly income, those with 
$70,000 to $125,000 in yearly income and 
those  earning more than $125,000 per 
year. Although the lower-income group, 
which corresponds roughly with the 
bottom 60 percent of families, is not poor 
by traditional standards, it incorporates 
middle-income households who do not 
have many financial resources but who are 
nonetheless ineligible for federal and state 
financial aid. It is these middle-income 
households for whom the financial burden 
of college is likely to be the highest. 
Increasing home equity from zero 
to $35,000 among low- and middle-
income families increased their college 
attendance rate by more than 210 
percent.  
Figure 7 demonstrates that low- and 
middle-income families are the most 
responsive to housing wealth changes.  
Having home equity at just the 25th 
percentile ($35,000) increased the college 
attendance rate from 9 percent to 29 
percent, an increase of more than 210 
percent. Increasing equity to $75,000 
would increase college enrollment to 52 
percent among this group, and the model 
The Effect of Housing Wealth on 
College Enrollment
Figure 6
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predicts that increasing it to $150,000 
would increase enrollment to 94 percent.  
There are  few families in this income 
group with such high home equity, but 
these results demonstrate that housing 
wealth particularly affects college decisions 
by lower-income families: Each additional 
$10,000 in home equity raised college 
enrollment by 6 percentage points. 
Among low- and middle-income 
families, average home equity actually 
increased by $15,611 between 2001 
and 2005, implying that rising housing 
wealth increased college enrollment by 
9 percentage points, or by 24 percent 
compared with what it would have been 
without the housing boom. Just 37 
percent would have enrolled, rather than 
the 46 percent who did. Figure 7 also 
shows that college-going responds much 
less to housing wealth for higher-income 
households, and one cannot statistically 
reject that housing wealth has no effect on 
college enrollment for these groups. 
The fact that lower-income households 
are the most responsive to home equity 
is particularly important for economic 
mobility. When housing prices rise, as 
Effect of Housing Wealth on College Enrollment, by Family Income
Figure 7
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children from lower-income households 
reduce their college-going relative to 
students from higher-income families. In 
general, this analysis strongly suggests 
that low- and middle-income families face 
financial difficulties paying for college, 
and demonstrates that these difficulties 
are highly sensitive to housing market 
fluctuations.
happened in the first half of the past 
decade, economic mobility should 
increase as access to higher education 
grows among lower-income households 
relative to higher-income households.  
Conversely, when home prices decline, 
as they have since the second half of the 
decade, the results from Figure 7 suggest 
economic mobility could decrease as 
tHe PeW cHaritaBle trusts18
attend change when their families’ home 
prices increase. 
data and methods
The data for these analyses come from 
the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth (NLSY97). This is a nationally-
representative survey of students who 
were ages 12 to 17 in 1997, and who 
have since been tracked annually. The 
restricted-use version of the data contains 
the metropolitan area in which each 
respondent lived in 1997 and detailed 
information about the colleges they 
attended. The sample in these analyses 
is confined to youth who lived in a 
metropolitan area in 1997, graduated from 
high school and went to college within 
two years.30 
Similar to the strategy for the college 
enrollment analyses, the analyses in 
this section and the next compare 
college-sector choices of observably 
similar students who lived in the same 
metropolitan area but graduated from 
high school at different times. As a result, 
the changes in their home prices differed 
Beyond the decision of whether to enroll 
in college, financial constraints could 
affect the quality of schools chosen. There 
is growing  evidence that students who 
attend a higher-quality university are more 
likely to graduate and to earn substantially 
more after graduation.28 This section 
presents results using the college sector of 
attendance as an indicator of “quality,” but 
analyses using other measures of quality 
that are correlated with sector—such as 
students’ SAT scores, graduation rates and 
per-student expenditures—yield similar 
conclusions.29 
In general, the various college sectors 
(two-year, non-flagship public four-year, 
flagship public and four-year private) differ 
dramatically in their level of resources and 
the academic preparation of the students 
they enroll. They also differ in the cost of 
attendance, with more elite institutions 
having much higher costs. Thus, it is 
important to understand whether these 
greater costs present a barrier for access 
to higher-quality schools among lower-
income households. The analyses in this 
section assess the extent to which students’ 
choices about which type of school to 
How Important is Family Wealth 
for College Quality? 
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The share attending two-year schools 
also decreased, from 39.6 percent to 37.7 
percent, a decline of almost 5 percent.  
The sorting out of the two-year sector 
is likely to have important long-run 
consequences, as students who enroll 
in community college have lower wages 
and are less likely to obtain a four-year 
degree than those who enroll in a four-year 
school.35
because of variation in the timing and 
strength of the housing boom across cities. 
This research strategy is subject to similar 
challenges as the research used in the 
college enrollment analyses, and the 
appendix details the ways in which these 
challenges were considered.31 Of note, 
in addition to a rich set of state, student, 
and family background characteristics, the 
analyses also statistically account for the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) 
scores of young people, which provide a 
strong measure of each student’s academic 
preparation for college.32 Including this 
variable in the empirical model allows a 
comparison of college choices made by 
students with the same test scores.33 
results
Home price increases induced 
students to attend higher-quality 
schools.
Figure 8 shows the predicted school 
type distribution of students exposed 
to different magnitudes of recent home 
price changes. For the sample as a whole, 
home price increases resulted in students 
attending higher-quality schools, with the 
changes occurring entirely within public 
institutions.34 
At the median home price change of 
$30,000, students increased attendance 
in state flagships by half of a percentage 
point, or 6.2 percent relative to the 
baseline of no increase in home price. 
The Effect of Housing Wealth on 
College Sector Choice
Figure 8
SOURCE: Multinomial logit estimates in Table 3 of 
Lovenheim and Reynolds (2011).
NOTE: Simulations of college sector enrollments rates 
among college attendees based on multinomial logit 
estimates and representing the marginal effects setting all 
other variables at their means. The home price changes refer 
to the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the four-year home 
price change distribution in the NLSY97 sample. Dollar 
amounts are in 2007 CPI-U-adjusted dollars. Bars may not 
add to 100 percent due to rounding.
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percent decline in community college 
enrollment. Although not shown, there is 
little evidence that college sector choices 
are influenced by home price changes for 
higher-income families.36
HOW IMpORTANT IS FAMIlY WEAlTH FOR COllEGE QUAlITY? 
The effect of increased wealth from 
rising home values on college quality 
was most pronounced for low- and 
middle-income families.
As shown in Figure 9, for low- and 
middle-income families, a $30,000 
increase in home prices led to 0.8 of a 
percentage point increase in the likelihood 
of enrolling in a state flagship, which 
translates into an 18 percent change. At 
the 75th percentile of home price changes, 
which is $60,000, students from families 
earning less than $70,000 per year were 
35 percent more likely to enroll in a state 
flagship university than were peers from 
families experiencing no appreciation in 
home price. They also were 28 percent less 
likely to enroll in a community college. 
For the full sample, there was no effect 
of home price changes on private-sector 
enrollment. However, low- and middle-
income youth whose families experienced 
$60,000 in recent home price changes 
were 6 percent more likely to enroll in a 
private university (though this effect is not 
statistically different from zero).
These results present strong evidence that 
students select higher-quality schools 
when their home prices increase, and 
that this effect is largest among low- and 
middle-income families. Home prices rose 
by $38,455 among the average low- to 
middle-income youth in the youngest 
cohort from 1998 to 2002, producing a 
24 percent increase in flagship enrollment 
among those attending college and a 17 
The Effect of Housing Wealth on 
College Sector Choice for Families 
with Income Less than $70,000
Figure 9
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A final, critical question is whether 
students who enroll in college and go 
to higher-quality schools due to the 
appreciation in their parents’ home have 
better educational outcomes. Figure 10 
shows the effect of different home-price 
changes on the likelihood of obtaining a 
college degree from a four-year institution 
for youth from families with incomes 
less than $70,000 per year (based on the 
same data and methods as in the previous 
section). The graduation rate for this group 
is only 28 percent, which underscores the 
importance of understanding the forces 
that drive graduation outcomes.
The results in Figure 10 suggest that 
increasing families’ financial resources 
when their children are of college-age 
could be a way to increase their children’s 
likelihood of graduation. A $30,000 
increase in home prices led to a graduation 
rate of 32.1 percent, an increase of 2.1 
percentage points (7 percent) over the 
baseline of no change. A $60,000 increase 
in home prices while the student is in 
high school increased the probability of 
graduating by more than 4 percentage 
points (14 percent). 
How Important is Family Wealth 
for College Graduation? 
The Effect of Housing Wealth on 
Four-year College Degree Receipt for 
Families with Incomes Less than 
$70,000
Figure 10
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Although this increase in resources is 
substantial, these results demonstrate 
that financial constraints likely play a 
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they would have been absent the housing 
boom. Put another way, the boom raised 
the likelihood of college graduation to 
32 percent, rather than the 29 percent it 
would have been with no change in home 
prices.
role in reducing graduation outcomes 
for low- and middle-income families. 
Given the actual increase in housing 
wealth the families of the youngest youth 
in the sample experienced from 1998 to 
2002, college graduation rates were 2.7 
percentage points (9 percent) higher than 
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Thus, college enrollment among low- and 
middle-income youth actually increased.  
Nevertheless, those induced to enroll by 
the recession or the stimulus package 
only partly overlap with those who would 
have enrolled if their family’s housing 
wealth had not deteriorated. A sizable 
fraction of low- and middle-income youth 
was prevented from enrolling in college 
because their families no longer had the 
financial resources to afford it, a direct 
result of the housing bust.
Decreased family wealth due to 
the housing bust also could have a 
large effect on the types of colleges 
students from low- and middle-income 
families attend. 
The empirical estimates predict that a 
35 percent decline in home prices will 
cause a 1.4 percentage point decline in 
enrollment in flagship public schools 
among students from families earning less 
than $70,000 per year who enroll in post-
secondary schooling. That is a 26 percent 
decline from the enrollment levels of the 
low- and middle-income youth examined 
in this report. The estimates also predict 
a 29 percent increase in community 
Effects of the Housing Market 
Decline
As shown in Figure 4, by 2010 home 
prices had declined 35 percent from 
their peak in 2006. The results from the 
empirical analyses above suggest that 
this decline is likely to significantly affect 
college-related decisions, particularly 
among low- and middle-income families.  
Because a 35 percent decline in home 
prices represents a large proportion 
of home equity, it is estimated to have 
declined by 54 percent between 2006 and 
2010 for homeowners with income less 
than $70,000 per year.37 
Among students from low- and 
middle-income families, the housing 
bust could ultimately reduce college 
enrollment, including in community 
colleges, by 30 percent. 
That projection would hold if nothing 
else affecting college-going had changed 
after 2006.  Of course, much did change, 
including the near collapse of the financial 
system and the resulting downturn of the 
economy. A weak job market may have 
induced many youth to enroll in college 
when they had difficulty finding a job. 
In addition, the 2009 federal stimulus 
greatly increased federal financial aid. 
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college attendance among college-going 
low- and middle-income youth due to 
home price reductions in the United 
States. Finally, the results reported above 
for college completion suggest recent 
declines in home prices will reduce 
college-completion rates by 12 percent for 
students from families earning less than 
$70,000 per year. 
As noted above, other changes in the 
economy during the housing bust 
mitigated some effects of declining home 
values on college going. Still, it is clear 
that increases in family wealth, including 
housing wealth, are an important factor in 
the decisions of many youth to enroll in 
and complete college.
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policy Implications
Helping families increase their wealth not 
only benefits them financially but also 
promotes upward economic mobility for 
their children. Moreover, the results of 
this report may actually understate the 
impact of predictably high financial assets 
on college attainment and completion, 
because they are based on families 
receiving a sudden windfall of wealth 
after children have been through their 
primary schooling. If children from low- 
and middle-income families never expect 
to attend college, an influx of wealth 
during high school may not be enough 
to convince them that college is a viable 
option (and they may not be academically 
prepared at that point).
The bad news is twofold. Although it is 
positive for the economy and American 
families that we are unlikely to see 
another unsustainable housing boom 
and subsequent bust, the bursting of 
the housing bubble reversed the gains 
in educational outcomes yielded by the 
boom. The sheer magnitude of the wealth 
gains seen by low- and middle-income 
families during the boom are unlikely 
to be matched by other investments or 
wealth-building tools, and it is difficult 
The results from this report speak most 
clearly to the role of housing wealth in 
college enrollment and completion, and 
thus it is not clear whether households 
are similarly responsive to other forms 
of wealth or to reductions in the cost of 
college attendance. Still, the good news is 
that increasing housing wealth among low- 
and middle-income families can increase 
rates of college enrollment and graduation 
and can increase access to higher-quality 
schools. This in turn can promote upward 
economic mobility. 
The report’s findings do not shed light 
on how wealth functions to promote 
educational attainment. In the most 
straightforward sense, families may 
simply draw down their wealth to directly 
finance education. But the additional 
collateral provided by wealth could also 
allow families to borrow more than they 
otherwise would—or perhaps an increase 
in wealth makes families feel more 
economically secure, and thus more open 
to their children taking on student loans or 
other debt to pay for a college education.  
Alternatively, greater wealth may improve 
family life in ways that promote better 
educational outcomes.  
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next to nothing, because they often do not 
make enough money to owe income tax or 
to itemize their deductions. The Project’s 
Principals have called for modification 
of federal supports and tax provisions 
to better target lower-income groups, 
especially as a strategy for helping them 
pay for college.40 
Creating incentives for opening child 
savings accounts—bank accounts set up in 
children’s names when they are young—is 
another possible mechanism for low-
income families to develop wealth through 
small deposits and compound interest.  
For example, families who open an 
account with a $500 deposit (potentially 
seeded by the federal government) and 
invest $20 a month with a one-to-one 
federal match would save more than 
$10,000 by the time their child is 18. The 
estimates presented here suggest that this 
would increase the likelihood of children 
from a low- or middle-income family 
attending college by nearly 20 percent.
Despite the recent volatility of the housing 
market, homeownership has historically 
been a powerful tool for asset building for 
Americans across the income distribution. 
For low-income families, it is often the 
largest asset they have. There are several 
ways policy makers could increase access 
to homeownership as a safe and secure 
savings vehicle, such as expanding 
eligibility of financial education for 
homeownership; making available simple 
“default” mortgage products that protect 
to envision public policies that could 
produce similar gains in the short term. 
Nonetheless, the report’s findings suggest 
three broad policy approaches that could 
significantly reduce the gap in college 
enrollment and graduation by income. 
All are taken from the policy road map 
authored by the Economic Mobility 
Project’s Principals, an ideologically diverse 
group of experts from the American 
Enterprise Institute, the Brookings 
Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the 
New America Foundation and the Urban 
Institute.38 These policy approaches 
include supporting family asset building 
and wealth creation among low- and 
middle-income families, providing those 
students with better access to financial 
supports to help pay for college and 
focusing on increasing college completion 
rates. 
Promote Asset Building Among Low- 
and Middle-Income Families
Current policies aimed at promoting 
saving and asset building are largely 
targeted at upper-income families—those 
who likely would be saving anyway. The 
Corporation for Enterprise Development 
(CFED) estimates that the federal 
government annually spends nearly $400 
billion to promote asset building, 90 
percent of which is administered through 
the tax code.39 As a result, CFED finds that 
more than half of these benefits accrued 
to the wealthiest 5 percent of taxpayers 
in 2009. Low-income families received 
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Increase College Completion Rates
This study’s results suggest that increased 
family wealth produces much greater 
effects on college attendance than on 
college quality and graduation. Many 
students who were able to attend college 
because of the housing boom could not 
attend higher-quality schools or, in many 
cases, finish their degree. EMP research 
confirms that low-income students 
drop out of two- and four-year colleges 
at alarming rates: a mere 32 percent of 
college students from families in the 
bottom fifth of the income ladder obtain 
a degree, compared with 67 percent of 
students from the top fifth.45 
Funding and evaluating high school 
programs that improve educational 
and labor market outcomes is a good 
first step.46 Students also need better 
support during their transition from 
high school to college and throughout 
their postsecondary education. 
Encouraging states to develop 
longitudinal measurement systems to 
track completion rates by race, income 
and other demographic indicators is a 
critical step to better assessing student 
performance over time.47 More attention 
also must be devoted to developing and 
evaluating programs that promote college 
completion, for example, through federal 
incentive grants to states and colleges.48 
families from unfavorable terms and 
conditions; and increasing tax credits for 
a portion of down payments, dependent 
upon income.41 
Help Students Better Access Financial 
Aid
Financial constraints are not the only 
factor impeding lower-income students’ 
enrollment in college; academic 
preparation also is critical. However, even 
among high-performing students, those 
who are lower-income are significantly 
less likely to enroll in and graduate 
from college than those who are high-
income.42 Helping these students connect 
to federal financial aid could go a long 
way to increasing their enrollment in, and 
graduation from, college. 
One way to help connect students 
to financial aid is by simplifying the 
Free Application for Federal Student 
Aid (FAFSA), the form issued by the 
Department of Education for determining 
eligibility for financial aid. A recent 
study found that it takes up to 10 hours 
to complete the 127 questions on the 
application, making the FAFSA more 
complex than the IRS’s form 1040 for 
completing a tax return.43 Alerting 
families of their children’s financial aid 
packages earlier than the spring of their 
senior year in high school could also help 
lower-income families without alternative 
sources of college financing.44
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Conclusion
families. Given the recent severe declines 
in housing wealth in many areas of the 
United States, the resulting differences 
in postsecondary investment by family 
income will only increase without 
policies designed to specifically address 
the growing difficulty these families face 
in financing a college education. Absent 
policy intervention, the decrease in wealth 
resulting from the housing bust could lead 
to a decrease in economic mobility that 
will persist far into the future.
Education has been considered a primary 
route to the American Dream for the 
better part of a century, and yet large 
disparities in educational attainment 
across the income distribution reinforce 
intergenerational gaps in economic 
mobility. This report suggests that college 
enrollment decisions—whether and 
where to attend—and graduation rates are 
affected by variation in family resources 
(as shown through housing wealth), 
particularly for low- and middle-income 
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As noted in the report, the research 
strategy used here relies on a number of 
assumptions. This appendix lists potential 
objections to the assumptions in the 
report and describes how these objections 
were addressed. For complete details, see 
Lovenheim (2011) and Lovenheim and 
Reynolds (2011).
Objection: If higher-ability students 
are more likely to live in Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) or 
neighborhoods with large home price 
changes, then those who experience 
home price changes will be more likely 
to go to college because they are more 
academically capable (or for some other 
unobserved reason), not because of the 
added family wealth.49
In the enrollment analyses, since fixed 
MSA-level characteristics are controlled 
for, the only concern is whether there is 
a correlation between home price change 
within MSAs and unobserved factors.  
The analysis also controls for a rich set of 
background characteristics that mitigate 
even the within-MSA problem, but do 
not necessarily solve it (see note 22).  
The possibility that a correlation remains 
between home price change within MSAs 
and unobserved factors was examined by 
estimating the effect of housing wealth on 
college enrollment separately by decade.  
Because housing wealth was lower and 
less liquid in the 1980s and 1990s, 
correlations between changes in home 
prices and college enrollment in these 
periods that were of similar magnitude to 
the 2000s correlation would indicate that 
home price changes may be correlated 
with unobserved factors. However, 
housing wealth affects college enrollment 
only in the 2000s, when it was most 
liquid. 
The analysis also used four-year changes 
in MSA-level home price indices to 
instrument for individual home equity 
at the time college decisions are made.  
That is, they were used to predict 
individual home equity at that time, with 
the predicted equity substituted for the 
reported level in the analyses. This was 
done under the assumptions that the 
change in MSA-level average price affects 
current home equity levels, and that the 
change in MSA-level average price only 
affects college enrollment due to its impact 
Appendix: Explaining the 
Research Strategy
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Furthermore, using MSA-level housing 
price indices forces all home values 
within an MSA to change at the same 
rate, meaning that all home-price-change 
variation across families within an MSA 
is driven solely by differences over time 
in the strength of the housing boom, 
leveraging the fact that students came of 
college age in different times.   
Within-MSA housing price growth rates 
are used to predict changes in individual 
home prices because the individual data 
used includes home prices only in 1997.  
A central concern is that home price 
growth will be higher for those with higher 
home values in 1997. If home price values 
in 1997 are correlated with unobserved 
factors that affect college choice and 
graduation, then the estimated effect of 
individual home-price growth on college 
choice will be exaggerated. However, 
the analysis estimated models that also 
control for 1997 home price levels, and 
they show results similar to those reported 
above. Because such models are identified 
only off of differential growth rates within 
cities over time, these results present 
evidence that the baseline results are not 
driven by unobserved correlation between 
unobserved family or youth factors and 
home price growth.
Finally, in the college choice and 
graduation models, homeownership 
in 1997 might also be correlated with 
on housing wealth of the household (after 
accounting for fixed MSA characteristics 
and other potentially confounding factors). 
The estimated effect of housing wealth 
on college enrollment in this model is 
based only on within-MSA variation over 
time in the strength of the housing boom, 
leveraging the fact that students came of 
college age in different times, with respect 
to the large home price changes driven 
by the boom. This model eliminates any 
within-MSA and year differences in home 
price growth. The effects are similar to 
those in the main analyses, and larger 
in the 2000s than in earlier decades, 
although the standard errors increased due 
to a loss of statistical power.
In the case of college sector choice and 
graduation, the set of control variables 
accounted for include students’ AFQT 
scores, which are a measure of cognitive 
ability (See endnote 31). The analysis 
controls for fixed state-level characteristics, 
so correlation between home-price change 
and unobserved factors is a problem 
only if it occurs within states. Though 
the analysis could not control for fixed 
MSA-level characteristics, which would 
narrow the problem even further, in the 
sector choice and graduation analyses, 
they are controlled for when examining 
direct measures of college quality, and the 
estimated effects of housing wealth were 
bigger than when only state-level factors 
were controlled. 
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However, strategic moves by families of 
high-ability students could occur prior to 
the four-year period.
If such sorting across MSAs occurred, 
it would produce a correlation between 
MSA home price change and student 
ability, and so the robustness checks above 
provide evidence that sorting is not biasing 
the results. In order to further examine 
whether sorting is a confounding factor, 
the analysis used the panel structure 
of the PSID. Each respondent can be 
traced back to an original household in 
which they lived at the start of the PSID 
in 1968. This original household’s MSA 
was then assigned to each current survey 
participant, and the average home price 
at the time of college decision-making 
from the 1968 household’s MSA was 
used as an instrument for home equity. In 
other words, the 1968 MSA’s home-price 
index in, say, 2005 was used to predict 
home equity in 2005, and the analysis 
then  examined the relationship between 
predicted home equity and college 
enrollment (under the assumptions that 
the 1968 MSA’s average home values in 
2005 are indeed related to 2005 housing 
wealth, and that the only way the 1968 
MSA’s average home values in 2005 can 
affect college enrollment is by increasing 
individual home equity in 2005, after 
accounting for fixed characteristics of 
the 2005 MSA and other potentially 
confounding factors). Any migration 
occurring across cities will not affect the 
unobserved factors, leading to similar 
problems. However, the analysis found 
no statistically significant effects of 
homeownership on college quality in 
the models, and homeownership rates 
are high enough in the sample that the 
issue is potentially a problem for only a 
small fraction of families. Ultimately, any 
problem relating to 1997 home prices or 
homeownership being correlated with 
unobserved factors must be confined 
to factors that influence both the 1997 
situation and price changes that occur 
within the high school years (which range 
from 1993 to 1997 for the oldest youth in 
the sample and from 1998 to 2002 for the 
youngest).
It is also worth noting that variation in 
the strength and timing of the housing 
boom across cities may be strongly related 
to local housing supply constraints, such 
as zoning regulation.50 That makes it less 
likely that home price changes prior to 
college decision-making primarily reflect 
the influence of some unobserved factor 
that is really driving college decisions.
Objection: Families with higher-ability 
students may be moving into areas with 
higher home price growth. 
As noted in the methods section, for the 
enrollment analyses, the analysis ensures 
that there are no moves across MSAs 
during the four-year period over which 
housing wealth change is measured by 
dropping such cases from the sample.  
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then renters and homeowners should be 
similarly affected. However, in neither case 
do renters respond to MSA-level home 
price changes, suggesting these types of 
contemporaneous and unobserved shocks 
are not biasing the estimates. Furthermore, 
local or state macroeconomic conditions, 
such as the unemployment rate and real 
per-capita income, are controlled for in 
all models, making it unlikely that labor 
demand shocks will be unobserved. In 
the choice/graduation models, state-level 
college/non-college wage ratios are also 
controlled for, and because high-skilled 
labor demand is not highly localized 
within states, this is likely to effectively 
account for MSA-level skill-biased demand 
as well. Finally, during the housing boom, 
mortgage credit growth was higher in areas 
with lower income growth.51
Objection: Because most states finance 
their schools through property taxes, 
which are a function of property values, 
it could be that high home price growth 
areas have growing school quality, which 
induces more students to attend college 
and to attend higher-quality schools.
There is much evidence in the economics 
of education literature that refutes the 
hypothesis that increased funding for 
schools leads to better educational 
outcomes.52 Using the NLSY97 data, the 
author estimated models of high school 
graduation to examine whether students 
experiencing recent home price changes 
were more likely to graduate from high 
validity of the resulting estimates. The 
results from this analysis are very similar 
to those that use change in actual MSA-
level prices as instruments—the effect of 
home equity on college decisions is much 
stronger in the 2000s than in the previous 
decades, though the estimates are very 
imprecise. Still, the analysis suggests that 
moving across MSAs is not biasing the 
results. 
Sorting is less of an issue for the college 
choice/graduation analyses because all 
locations are fixed as of 1997, and home 
price changes used for identification occur 
over different years for the youngest and 
oldest youth in the sample. The only cross-
MSA sorting that could be problematic is 
that involving sorting into MSAs before 
1997 based on anticipated housing value 
changes when the youth is in high school.  
Furthermore, in the models examining 
direct measures of college quality, 
which include controls for fixed MSA 
characteristics, the sorting would have to 
differ according to the age of the youth 
relative to the timing of the largest home 
price increases within each MSA. 
Objection: Local labor demand shocks 
may have caused an increase in home 
prices as well as increased college-
going.
The author re-estimated the two 
enrollment models relying on MSA-level 
price changes for renters only. If local labor 
demand shocks are driving the estimates, 
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as housing prices increase (because 
enrollment in non-flagship schools 
increased).
Objection: The assumptions in 
estimating counterfactual change in 
housing wealth barring equity extraction 
are unrealistic.
The Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) has more information 
on home loans than the PSID does—
including the loan term and interest rate—
requiring fewer assumptions to be made in 
estimating this counterfactual. However, 
it allows only for the observation of two 
years of housing price and equity changes.  
Nonetheless, the results using the SIPP 
were similar to those presented here.
school. No such relationship appears in 
the data, suggesting that the results and 
conclusions of these analyses are not due 
to increasing K-12 education quality.
Objection: If strong macroeconomic 
growth raised state tax revenues, it may 
have improved students’ college quality, 
rather than greater family wealth doing 
so.
In addition to the lack of evidence noted 
above that macroeconomic shocks are 
important, the author also estimated the 
direct effect of state-level housing price 
change on state-level college resources.  
The evidence for effects is very weak, with 
no consistent effects across the three types 
of public colleges, and faculty-student 
ratios in four-year colleges declining 
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10 Shiller (2010).
11 Current Population Survey (CPS) March  
Supplements. 
12 Isaacs, Sawhill and Haskins (2008).
13 Ibid.
14 Author’s calculations from the October Current 
Population Survey.
15 Lovenheim and Reynolds (2011).
16 Haskins, Holzer and Lerman (2009); Dynarski and 
Scott-Clayton (2006); Bettinger et al. (2009).
17 Some recent work in economics has suggested that 
most of the differences in college investment by family 
income is due to academic preparation and not family 
resources at the time of the attendance decision (e.g., 
Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Cameron and Taber, 
2004). These studies use data from cohorts graduating 
high school in the early 1980s, and as Figure 3 shows, 
college costs were much lower in that time period. 
In contrast, analyses using more recent data point 
to a larger role for financial constraints in driving 
differences in college enrollment by family income 
(Belley and Lochner, 2007).
18 While outside the scope of this particular paper, it 
is important to note that academic preparation reflects 
both underlying achievement gaps and high school 
preparation, including high school and peer group 
quality. See both Turner (2004) and Bettinger (2009) 
for more information about how college quality and 
costs could have important impacts during the college 
application stage, or Lareau (2007) for an examination 
of how behavioral differences between income groups 
affect achievement. Other research focuses on how the 
Endnotes
1 An estimate of the four-year change in home value 
when each respondent is in high school was used to 
measure the change in housing wealth experienced.  
Home equity was calculated from the self-reported 
home value and remaining principal balance in the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
2 For full methodological details, please see the data 
and methods sections and the appendix explaining the 
research strategy.
3 Flagship public universities are each state’s elite 
public institution. In the case of California, Texas and 
New York, there are multiple flagships.
4 Because of the overall deterioration of the economy 
in the same time period, particularly the combination 
of a faltering job market and more generous federal 
financial aid, these effects were countered substantially 
and limited the decline in college-going.
5 Isaacs, Sawhill and Haskins (2008).
6 See Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) for a 
description of the skill upgrading of the United States 
economy.
7 Bound, Lovenheim and Turner (2010a) show 
that college resources have large effects on college 
completion rates, and Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 
(2010b) present evidence that collegiate resources 
reduce time to degree. Rouse (1995), Long and 
Kurlaender (2009) and Reynolds (2009) all show that 
two-year college attendance is associated with lower 
educational attainment.
8 College Board (2010).
9 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (author’s 
calculations).
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is observed. MSAs may be identified in the PSID by 
applying for and accessing restricted-use data.
24 Home ownership in these analyses indicates the 
family owned their home over all four years.
25 Home equity in any year may be computed from 
self-reported home values and remaining mortgage 
principal, and so computing the actual change in 
housing wealth is straightforward. To estimate the 
counterfactual change in housing wealth, one must 
estimate what housing equity at the end of the four-
years would have been barring any equity extraction.  
That requires estimating what the remaining principal 
would have been.  
 The author first estimates each household’s 
mortgage interest rate and loan age at the beginning of 
the four-year period. This involves assigning an interest 
rate for typical mortgages originated 0 to 30 years ago 
for all years in the sample, under the assumption that 
all mortgages have a 30-year term and fixed interest 
rates equal to the national average in the originating 
year. With these assigned interest rates, the author 
computes the ratio of monthly mortgage payment to 
remaining principal for each loan age in each year.  
Each of these ratios corresponds to an interest rate/loan 
age pairing that might be assigned to a household’s 
mortgage in a given year.  
 Next, the author computes the mortgage-payment-
to-remaining-principal ratio for each household at the 
beginning of the four-year period (both the numerator 
and denominator are reported in the PSID). To assign 
each household’s mortgage in that beginning year an 
interest rate and loan age combination, the author 
chooses from the combinations available in that year 
the one corresponding to the payment-to-principal 
ratio that is closest to the household’s ratio (technically, 
the one that minimizes the squared difference between 
the household’s payment-to-principal ratio and the 
corresponding candidate ratio).  
 Computing the counterfactual remaining principal 
(with no equity extracted) at the end of the four-year 
period is straightforward using the monthly mortgage 
payment reported by the household in that year, the 
assigned loan interest rate and the loan age (adding 
four to the assigned age at the beginning of the four-
magnitude of achievement gaps has changed over time 
(Reardon, 2011).
19 Analyses in Lovenheim (2011) show that about 
half the increase in home equity extraction was due to 
increasing home prices and half was due to extraction 
becoming easier.
20 This section presents a relatively non-technical 
overview of a research paper by the author 
(Lovenheim, 2011). Interested readers can consult the 
paper for technical details of the estimation strategy 
and for a detailed discussion of the data.
21 In 1997 the PSID switched from yearly sampling 
to a bi-yearly sampling. Thus, the analysis uses survey 
years 2001 (focusing on the change in housing wealth 
from 1997 to 2001), 2003 (focusing on the change 
from 1999 to 2003) and 2005 (focusing on the 
changes from 2001 to 2005). 
22 The validity of the empirical model rests on two key 
assumptions. The first is that recent home price growth 
positively impacts current housing wealth levels, which 
the data show to be true.  The second is that after 
accounting for the potentially confounding observable 
factors, earlier changes in housing wealth affect youth 
college decisions only by affecting their housing wealth 
at the time of decision-making. If these assumptions 
are correct, the problem of unrecognized confounding 
factors will disappear because housing wealth changes 
are related to current housing wealth but not these 
other unobserved factors. The relationship between 
predicted housing wealth and college-going will then 
indicate the causal importance of housing wealth on 
college enrollment. 
23 These variables include whether or not the 
household owns its home in all four years; the 
educational attainment, age, marital status and sex of 
the household head; the number of dependents under 
age 18 living in the household; the youth’s race and 
gender; total family income; per capita income in the 
MSA or state in which the household lives; the state 
unemployment rate; the size of the 18- to 22-year-old 
population in the state; the year in which a youth is 
observed; and the MSA or state in which the youth 
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similar to the change in home wealth experienced in 
the absence of equity extraction (see endnote 21).
31 The key assumptions are that after accounting for 
the rich set of potentially confounding factors, changes 
in metropolitan home prices in the four years prior 
to college decision-making, 1997 home values, and 
whether or not a family owns its home in 1997 are 
unrelated to anything else that affects college sector 
choice.
32 AFQT scores reflect family background and other 
influences to some extent, so it is not accurate to say 
that scores reflect only differences in cognitive ability.
33 The model also controls for family income, 
maternal and paternal education, sex, race/ethnicity, 
age in 1997 (birth cohort), whether the family 
owned or rented in 1997, the state of residence, state 
unemployment rates, state per capita income, the 
number of four-year and two-year institutions per 18- 
to 24-year-old in the state, the ratio of hourly wages 
of 25- to 55-year-olds with a bachelor’s degree in the 
state to hourly wages for those with an associate’s 
degree, the same ratio comparing college graduate’s 
wages to those of high school graduates, the state’s real 
need-based aid per student, and indicators for missing 
data for parental education and family income. All of 
the state-level variables are measured when the youth 
is eighteen years old. Renters in 1997 are included in 
the analyses and assigned home value changes of zero.  
Youth who did not take the AFQT are omitted (about 
16 percent of college-going youth in the survey).
34 It is likely that the absence of an effect on attending 
private universities is partly due to those schools 
being more likely to take home equity into account in 
considering institutional aid to students. 
35 Reynolds (2009); Rouse (1995); Bound, Lovenheim 
and Turner (2010a); Lovenheim and Reynolds (2011).
36 Housing price change induces families with 
incomes between $70,000 and $125,000 to switch 
from non-flagship to flagship public colleges, but no 
other effects are statistically significant at conventional 
levels. The author also finds that housing wealth 
year period). The counterfactual housing wealth is 
just reported home value minus the counterfactual 
remaining principal. Finally, the counterfactual change 
in housing wealth is this estimate minus the housing 
wealth computed four years earlier from reported 
home value and remaining principal. All families who 
do not own their home in all four years are assigned a 
counterfactual change of zero.
26 All dollar amounts are in 2007 dollars, adjusted for 
inflation using the CPI-U.
27 College enrollment in 2005 in the sample was 57.6 
percent among homeowners, so it would have been 
53.5 percent in the absence of the housing boom. The 
4.1 percentage point increase is 8 percent of the 53.5 
percent counterfactual.
28 Reynolds (2009); Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 
(2010a); Rouse (1995); Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg 
(1999); Hoekstra (2009); Black and Smith (2004, 
2006).
29 This section and the next present evidence from 
a second research paper (Lovenheim and Reynolds, 
2010). Interested readers can consult that paper for 
technical details of the estimation strategy and for a 
detailed discussion of the data.
30 A limitation of these data, however, is that housing 
information only is available for 1997. Because 
home equity accumulation in the time period the 
student is making college decisions is unobserved, 
an estimate of the four-year change in home value 
when each respondent is in high school is used to 
measure the change in housing wealth experienced.  
This home price change is estimated in three steps.  
First, the family’s home value when the youth was 
17 is estimated by inflating the reported 1997 home 
value based on the increase in metropolitan-wide 
home prices from 1997 to the year the youth was 
seventeen. The family’s home value when the youth 
was 13 years old is estimated in the same way. Finally, 
the change in home value experienced by the family 
is just the difference of these two estimates. To the 
extent that family home value changes are reflected 
in metropolitan-wide price changes, this measure is 
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regulations related to minimum mortgage standards 
and credit retention requirement are ongoing as 
policy makers grapple with the challenge of making 
homeownership an accessible, safe and secure 
investment.
42 College Board (2008).
43 Haskins, Holzer and Lerman (2009).
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Economic Mobility Project Principals (2009).
47 Ibid.
48 Haskins, Holzer and Lerman (2009).
49 A Metropolitan Statistical Area is a geographic entity 
defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) for use by Federal statistical agencies.
50 Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2006) and Glaeser, 
Gyourko and Saks (2005).
51 Mian and Sufi (2009).
52 Hanushek, Eric A. (2003).
improves the quality of schools students attend in 
terms of math SAT scores, faculty-student ratios, 
expenditures per student, instructional expenditures 
per student and graduation rates. The effects 
are confined to four-year schools and primarily 
concentrated on low- and middle-income youth. 
Finally, housing wealth increases the likelihood of 
attending college out of state. See Lovenheim and 
Reynolds (2011).
37 This calculation assumes that homeowners with 
income under $70,000 experienced the same average 
price decline as homeowners in general.
38 Economic Mobility Project Principals (2009).
39 CFED (2008). See also Cramer et al. (2009); and 
Carasso, Reynolds and Steuerle (2008).
40 Economic Mobility Project Principals (2009).
41 Ibid. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, signed into law on July 
21, 2010, included a variety of housing reforms. For 
instance, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
was required to propose model disclosure for mortgage 
loan transactions, and the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development was charged with creating 
an Office of Housing Counseling. Debates about 
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